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Based on data taken from 412 adult education students in Montreal, Quebec,
Canada, this research attempts to show that attitudes toward French Canadian
Separatism by the sample members can be accounted for by differentiaf
communication processes. Results show that attitudes held by sample
members are well explained (R2 = .64) by a weighted average of the
information they received from interpersonal and media sources. The resultant 
attitude shows substantial effects on behaviors related to separatism for the
same respondents.
hile the role of communication processes in thew formation of radical political movements has been
considered fundamental even by scholars predating Aristotle,
contemporary communication researchers have generally left
the investigation of these processes to other disciplines. One
of the most widely propounded explanations of these
movements contends that they are populated essentially by
the alienated lower classes who are seeking to modify the
conditions of their alienation. Marx is undoubtedly the most
well known exponent of this view. One of the more recent
sociological theories in this genre, which has become to be
known as the mass society theory of extremism, was
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proposed by Lipset (1963). According to Lipset, certain
psychological and interpersonal features inherent in the
structural situation of the lower classes make them prone to
left-wing extremism. These conditions include low education,
isolation from secondary groups in society, and socialization
practices which lead toward the development of authoritarian
personalities. Lipset (1963: 114) maintains that
the lower-class individual is likely to have been exposed to
punishment, lack of love, and a general atmosphere of tension
and aggression since early childhood-all experiences which tend
to produce deep-rooted hostilities expressed by ethnic prejudice,
political authoritarianism, and chiliastic transvaluational religion.
Gradually, evidence has mounted indicting the mass
society position. A good part of this evidence derives from
examinations of the two major types of left-wing movements
in the United States during the 1960s: student activism and
Black protest. The student protest provides a particular
anomaly in the notion that left-wing violence is a function of
membership in the poorly educated lower classes. Not only
did the students not represent the lower classes of the U.S.
population in general, but even when compared just with the
student population, &dquo;the student movement represents the
disaffection not of an underprivileged stratum of the student
population but of the most advantaged sector of the
students&dquo; (Flacks, 1967: 55). Flacks’ data also belie the
notion that explains disaffection among socially advantaged
youth by suggesting that their academic performance leads
them to expect failure or downward mobility. Flacks’
findings show that the protestors have slightly better grades
than nonprotestors.
The Black protests of the 1960s also dispute the proposals
of lower-class extremism. C. McPhail (1971) examined the
results of ten different reports concerning individual partici-
pation in five different riots. He found such socioeconomic
indicators as level of education, income level, employment,
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underemployment, and occupational status to be unrelated
to, or only sl ightly related to, riot participation in these
stud ies.
Even when restricting attention to the lower-class extrem-
ists, the evidence indicates that they espouse their extremism
for reasons other than those cited by mass society theory.
Portes (1971) tested three key hypotheses of mass society
theory on a sample of lower-class Chileans. He found that
extremism among these lower-class individuals was unrelated
to levels of education, participation in secondary groups, or
exposure to the mass media, evidence clearly discrepant with
mass society predictions.
Possibly the crucial failure in mass society theory has been
the notion that left-wing radicalism is a deviant process of
attitude formation. Portes (1971) points out that implicit in
Lipset’s schema is the view that left-wing extremism is
somewhat simplistic, irrational, and abnormal behavior.
According to Portes (1971: 829), Lipset contends that
embracing of left-wing ideology &dquo;far from following the
normal processes of attitude formation, is depicted as an
exceptional deviant case.&dquo;
The recent investigations into political socialization have
indicated, however, that individuals’ political partisanship
(Knoke, 1972; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes,
1960), attachment to the political system (Hess and Torney,
1967), sentiments toward democracy ( Lipset, 1963), vote in
specific elections (Rose, 1957), attitudes toward specific
political issues (Jennings and Neimi, 1968), and other
political attitudes can be traced to normal socialization
processes. Essentially, these studies have shown, albeit
tentatively, that an individual’s political attitude position is a
function of information he or she receives about these
attitude objects, particularly information from parents, peers,
and teachers. It appears reasonable to assume that the
processes which have generated these attitudes should be the
same ones which give rise to political extremism.
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There is currently evidence available to support this
assumption. Flacks (1967) and Keniston (1967), among
others (Solomon and Fishman, 1963), have demonstrated
that student activists have parents who are more liberal in
their political views than are the parents of nonactivists.
According to Flacks ( 1967: 68), &dquo;the great majority of these
students [the activists] are attempting to fulfill and renew
the political traditions of their families.&dquo; In addition,
Keniston argues that peer group support is a prime factor in a
student’s decision either to become an activist or to remain
one. Portes ( 1971 ) found that the two best predictors of
left-wing radicalism in his study were the political ideology of
the parents, and the political orientation of the neighborhood
in which the individual lived.
Recapping briefly, the view posited here sees the process
of becoming a radical as essentially a function of being
exposed more frequently to a radical political ideology than
to a more conservative one.
While at first all this may seem of only peripheral interest
to the communication researcher, the failure of the mass
society view along with the relatively recent success of the
simpler differential socialization model suggests that political
radicalization is basically a communication process. This
paper investigates the hypothesis that political radicalization
is wholly a consequence of communication processes which
lie within the domain of communication research.
. A COMMUNICATION THEORY
OF POLITICAL RADICALIZATION
The differential socialization model suggested by the
pattern of available data may be characterized as a set of
information sources 1, 2, 3, ... , n, each of which provides
information favoring (on the average) some level of radi-
calism, X1’ X2, x3, ... , x~. Each source is furthermore
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assumed to provide a d ifferential quantity of information.
The quantity of information about the topic in question may
be represented as the product of the amount of exposure the
individual has from each source a;; and the proportion of that
exposure which is relevant to that topic b;. Thus, the product
aibi represents the amount of exposure an individual has had
to the ith information source. Following this notation,
differential socialization theory takes the form:
_ 
n
P &dquo; a1 b1 x1 ~ a2b2x2 = ... + a~bnxn = aibixi [1] ]
¡-1
where p represents the value of an individual’s attitude
position on a continuum of political radicalism.
Expressed as in equation 1, differential socialization .
theory does not anticipate that information from any source
is more or less effective than other primary sources, but
differential effectiveness has long been hypothesized by
communication researchers, particularly in the context of
research on source credibility ( I nsko, 1967). More general,
therefore, is model 2: .
n
p=~t~a~-b~x~ +~t2a2b2x2 +...+~cnanbnxn = ¿ Il¡a¡b¡x¡ [2]
¡=1 I
where p; represents a weighting factor describing the net
effectiveness of a single &dquo;bit&dquo; of information from the ith
source.
By contrast, a central hypothesis of mass society theory
argues that political isolation (i.e., separation from communi-
cation sources itself predisposes individuals to radical politi-




p=a~ +3~+33+...+a~ = ~ ~ ai [3]
I=I 1
or, assuming the sources 1, 2, ... n are differentially effec-
tive,
n .
. P = 111 a, + M2a2 + ... + 11333 = lijai [4]
. i=1
Since the structures of equations 2 and 4 are identical (i.e.,
both are first-degree polynomials in n terms), a direct,
quantitative comparison of the two hypotheses is given
readily by a comparison of the multiple correlations each
produces with p, the individual’s political position. Further-
more, the overall predictive ability of each theory is given by
its multiple correlation, and the relative net effectiveness of
each of the information sources 1, 2, ... , n is given by the
partial slopes (which correspond to the weighting factors mi)
yielded by the regression procedure.
DATA
The theory detailed above argues that the extent to which
any individual holds radical political views is a simple linear
function of the extent to which he or she has been exposed
to a preponderance of information favoring such a view.
Accordingly, a sample of 412 was drawn from the adult
students enrolled in undergraduate courses during the sum-
mer session ( 1970) at Loyola of Montreal and the Universite
de Montreal, both located in Montreal, Quebec. The re-
spondents at Loyola of Montreal were enrolled in social
science courses and at the Universite de Montreal in the
Faculte des Lettres et Sciences Humaines. Both groups of
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respondents were engaged for the most part in full-time
occupations and were students only on a part-time basis.
The respondents (N = 412) were subdivided on the basis of
linguistic orientation into three categories-unilingual French,
unilingual English, or bilingual. The French respondents
numbered 104; the English, 115; and the bilingual, 193.
Questionnaires (in the appropriate languages) were admin-
istered to the sample on which respondents were asked to
estimate: (a) the average amount of time spent reading
newspapers, (b) the approximate frequency with which
respondents saw reference made to French Canadian Separa-
tism in those newspapers that they read, and (c) the general
bias of that coverage. The first item was scaled: 0 = not at all;
1 = a few hours a month; 2 = a few hours a week; 3 = a few
hours a day; 4 = nearly all the time. The second item was
scaled: 0 = not at all; 1 = very seldom; 2 = seldom; 3 =
frequently; 4 = very frequently. The last item (bias) was
scored -2 = highly opposed to separatism; -1 = opposed; 0 =
neither for nor against separatism; +1 = in favor of
separatism; +2 = strongly in favor of separatism. This
three-item index was repeated for second-most frequently
read newspapers, first and second television, records and
tapes, movies, family and first and second most frequently
seen friends. Thus, the first item of each three-item index is
an approximate measure of contact with that particular





where n = the number of media 13, represent the exposure p ;
= a weighting factor, and ai the amount of exposure the
individual reports with the ith medium items) serves as a
reasonable approximate combined measure of total media
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exposure and its inverse of social isolation. Since the weights
are those resulting from regressing attitudes toward separa-
tism upon these exposure variables, the chance is optimized
of supporting the mass society schools’ hypothesis regarding
the importance of exposure to media and interpersonal
infl uence.
On the other hand, for each source, the product of
exposure multiplied by bias forms an index which varies
between ±32. It may be seen as representing the amount of
favorable or unfavorable information (on the average) the
individual has received about separatism from that source.







serves as a reasonable approximate combined measure of the
information that the individual has received.
In spite of differences among separatists concerning
tactics, F rench Canad ian Separatism may be seen as an
essentially radical political ideology, since the realization of
separatist goals-primarily the political separation of the
Province of Quebec from the Dominion of Canada-requires a
radical revision of the political structure of Canada. Accord-
ingly, ascription to the goals of separatism is considered
prima facie a radical political belief in this study, and the
dependent variable is measured straightforwardly as a single .
Likert item: &dquo;What position do you take concerning the issue
of SEPARATISM?&dquo; Responses are the standard, &dquo;strongly
favorable, favorable, neither favorable nor unfavorable, un-
favorable, and strongly unfavorable.&dquo; Several other important
variables were also measured and will be discussed as they
become germane.
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Portes’ (1971) findings indicate no substantial relationship
between measures of social isolation-either alone or in
combination-and political radicalism. Table 1 represents the
equivalent data from our research. Contrary to Portes’
findings, measurable (although not absolutely large) relation-
ships do exist, at least in the aggregate, between isolation as
measured by media contact and separatism, and apparently in
the direction predicted by &dquo;mass society&dquo; theory. (That is,
media contact is negatively related to separatism.) To be sure,
these relationships are vanishingly small, particularly after
TABLE 1
Zero-Order Correlations and Twelfth-0rder Standardized Partial
Regression Coefficients of Attitude Toward Separatism Regressed on
Exposure Indices
a. p > .05.
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correcting for shrinkage (R2 = .14, .05 and .07, respectively,
for French, English, and bilingual subsamples). In an impor-
tant sense, however, this is not a test of the theory at all,
since the theory does not predict that the alienated will be
more radical politically-rather, more precisely, it predicts
that the alienated will be &dquo;more susceptible&dquo; to a radical
appeal given that they are exposed to it. Isolation, however,
should lessen the likelihood of exposure to radical ideologies,
and it is precisely those with little or no media contact who
should be expected to have the least contact with any
political ideology (recalling that media include interpersonal
contacts in this operationalization). Moreover, it should be
strongly suspected that establishment media generally present
unfavorable views of radical political ideologies, and, conse-
quently, greater media exposure should subject individuals to
greater anti-leftist information. Failure to control for media
bias should yield zero-order correlations between simple
exposure and leftist radicalism which are negative. Such
results would in fact support the second theory-the differen-
tial socialization theory.
Table 2 shows the mean value of the media indices. As
suspected, 31 of the 39 biases are negative-that is, anti-
separatist. Clearly, exposure to media is closely associated
with exposure to anti-separatist information. Only among the
French-speaking sample are any favorable sources to be
found, and it should be recalled that this subsample speaks
only French. Still, the zero-order correlations afford no
control for other variables suspected to play a role in this
process.
If the theory underlying this research is correct, then the
indices of exposure, coverage, and bias should produce
substantially improved predictive power. Table 3, which lists
the correlations (both zero-order and multiple) of the media
indices and separtism strongly substantiates the differential
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TABLE 2
Mean Bias of Media Toward Separtism
socialization theory. First of all, the multiple correlations are
substantially higher, and explained variances using the indices
of coverage, exposure, and bias are doubled for the French
sample, tripled for the English sample, and increased sixfold
for the bilingual sample. ~ ,
Although these data favor the communication-based
theory of political socialization quite clearly, several addi-
tional considerations might be made. First, as the coefficients
of determination ( R2 ) reveal, the political positions of the
sample members are not completely accounted for by these
indices. This is as it should be, since no theory would predict
that any individual’s political position on a long-term issue
like separatism could be wholly explained by a measure of
information received only recently (as these are), no matter
how complete such a measure may be. Measurement of the
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Table 3
Zero-Order Correlations and Twelfth-Order Standardized Partial
Regression Coefficients of Attitude Toward Separatism Regressed on
Exposure Coverage/Bias Indices
a. p >.05.
complete communication histories of the respondents in this
topic is of course not feasible for such a large sample (n =
412), but we can estimate the effects of these earlier
processes by the attitudes each respondent reports toward
other topics related to separatism. Table 4 adds such
additional information sources as are available in these data,
along with several sociostructural variables, as well as
plausible operationalizations for other elements of the
political attitude complex of which separatism is very likely a
part This last is particularly important even though not an
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TABLE 4
Twenty-Ninth and Thirtieth-Order Standardized Partial
Regression Coefficients
a. p ~.05.
b. See Lord and Novick (1968: 286, equation 13.2.1).
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information source in the strict sense, because the research
reported here (as does almost all survey research) intervenes
in a process which has gone on long before the data were
gathered. Consequently, the researcher must recognize and
deal with the effects of other attitudes previously formed and
related to the attitudes in question (Woelfel and Haller,
1971 ).
The addition of these variables into the analysis serves
another purpose as well. Since these data represent single-
point-in-time survey observations, they can at best represent
covariation in the sample; thus, the hypothesis that persons
deliberately seek out media coverage favoring their own view
cannot be prima facie ruled out. Should such be the case,
however, inclusion of the related attitudes complex, along
with sociostructural factors, should not result in substantial
increased explained variance, and furthermore would reduce
or eliminate the net effects of the message variables. A sizable
increase in the variance explained, however, would indicate
that (a) the communication model of political radicalization
shows substantial predictive utility, and (b) differential
exposure to messages, insofar as it is independent (additive)
of prior attitudes, is more likely viewed as exerting causal
effects over attitudes than as an effect of selective exposure.l
Table 4 includes, then, along with those variables previous-
ly reported in Table 3, the sociostructural variables sex, age,
university status (i.e., year in school), and religion (measured
as dummy variables); the model-type interpersonal influence
variables ( 1 ) number of friends who have assisted separatist
political candidates and (2) number of friends who have
attended separatist rall ies and demonstrations, and the set of
attitudes (measured on standard 5-point Likert scales) toward
the United States, France, Great Britain, French Canada,
English Canada, and Canada as a whole, all of which ought
reasonably to be related to separatism. Table 4 also presents
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the measured net relationship between this set of variables,
along with the measured separatist attitude, and two behav-
ioral measures of separatism: frequency of assisting separatist
political candidates and frequency of attendance at separatist
rallies and demonstrations (both self-reported).
Of first interest are the sizes of the coefficients of
determination, which are very large, particularly in the case
of attitude toward separatism. Given the very large sample
size (n = 412), these sizable coefficients cannot be inter-
preted as a simple result of the relatively large number (29
and 30, respectively) of independent variables, and the
negligible change of these coefficients when corrected for
shrinkage shows this clearly. These coefficients alone provide
strong support for a communication-based theory of political
socialization.
An even stronger pattern of support is revealed by an
analysis of the individual regression coefficients. When the
dependent variable is the attitude toward separatism, inter-
personal communication processes are particularly strong,
with family and friends’ communication indices and friends’
behavior variables large and significant. The sizable and
significant coefficients for the linguistic orientation variables,
the related attitudes toward French Canada, English Canada,
and Canada in general, and the religious orientation variables
support as well the notion that considerable prior informa-
tion flow processes have not been tapped by this design. The
small and nonsignificant coefficients for the various media
indices indicate clear support for the notion that different
sources are differentially effective in controlling for exposure
and bias, and further show media sources to be consistently
less effective than interpersonal sources. While no speculation
about the reasons for th is d iscrepancy wil I be presented here,
this is clearly an issue of major concern to the communi-
cation researcher.
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When the dependent variables are the behaviors attendance
at separatist ralies and assisting separatist candidates, attitude
effects partial out the effects of all communication variables
except for family in the case of assistance of separatist
candidates, as should be expected. (Why family effects
should persist in this instance is not clear, although this
deviation is probably minor.) Similarly, the substantial net
direct effects of friends assisting separatist candidates on the
individual’s own assistance of separatist candidates, and of
friends’ attendance at separatist rallies on the individual’s
own attendance might indicate compliance to group pressures
independent of attitude or, perhaps more likely, may
represent the simple fact that attendance at such events
necessarily creates exposure to others already engaged in such 
’
activities who later become friends.
DISCUSSION
Several objections might be levelled against this design and
should be considered. Principal among these is the suggestion
that the information received from various media (including
friends) is, in fact, not an antecedent condition of the
individual’s attitude, but rather a consequence of the attitude
by means of a process of selective exposure. Briefly, the
notion of selective exposure assumes that information
sources and media are sought out by the individual on the
basis of their similarity to his or her own views. Selective
exposure in the present case assumes that the individual
chooses friends and other sources of information insofar as
the information they convey is consistent with his or her own
political position. While such a theory might initially appear
to be equally supported by these data, the balance of
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evidence appears to oppose the selective exposure hypothesis
in general and the political homophily hypothesis in partic-
ular.
First, even under laboratory conditions where structural
restrictions over the selective exposure process can be
. eliminated, the bulk of studies fail to show such an effect.
Sears and Freedman (1971) examine eighteen experimental
studies of the phenomena, and find only five which support
the selective exposure hypothesis, eight which show no
relationship, and five which show subjects actually prefer to
expose themselves to communications inconsistent with their
own attitudes. The authors suggest:
Therefore, we cannot conclude that a preference for supportive 
’
information is a strong or prevelant phenomenon. In these
relatively well-controlled situations, in which a person can expose
himself easily to either supportive or non-supportive information,
the mechanism of selective exposure is not an important
explanation of how people resist persuasion [Sears and Freed-
man, 1971: 289] .
. If selective exposure is a minor phenomenon under .
laboratory conditions, it should be expected to be even less .
salient in real-life settings, where structural factors mitigate
the individual’s ability to choose freely among information
sources. Here the evidence is convincing. Duncan, Haller, and
Portes (1968) show in a study of high school boys in
. Lenawee County, Michigan, that the high correlation be-
tween the levels of aspirations of best friends cannot be
accounted for by status homophily. Similarly, Segal has
shown in a study of friendship preferences in the Maryland
State Police force that structural factors like rank, assign-
ment, headquarters, and physical propinquity are the most
important variables governing friendship choices in the
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department. These relationships are even demonstrated in a
strong tendency for trainees to choose friends whose last
name is close to their own in alphabetical order, presumably
since locker assignments are alphabetical. In studies of
interpersonal influence over educational and occupational
plans, Woelfel (1972) has shown that well over fifty percent
of all persons designated by high school students as major
information sources about education and occupation can be
accounted for by structurally determined physical propin-
quity.
In the present sample, the effects of self-selection of
sources along lines of congruence should be even further
attenuated by the fact that (a) the sample members are adults
whose associates are likely to be governed rather strongly by
occupational and family constraints, and (b) nearly two-
thirds of the sample is monolingual, and media biases break
strongly along I i ngu istic division (see Table 2). Even if we
were to conclude, in the face of this evidence, that
self-selection along lines of homophily does occur in this
sample, our best guess would be that the amount of variance
in the bias of the sources explained uniquely by political
homophily or self-selection would be inconsequentially small.
Clearly, caution should be used in the interpretation of
these single-stage survey data. Nonetheless, the overall size of
the coefficients of determination, along with the very
systematic pattern of regression coefficients can be viewed as
supporting a communication-based theory of political radical-
ization, even though the theory presented here is very
rudimentary. Moreover, these data do show unambiguously
that different information sources have differential effective-
ness over political attitudes, even controlling for amount of
exposure and bias of coverage, with mass media consistently
less effective than interpersonal sources.
[261] 
NOTE
1. In Table 3, regression equations were calculated separately within each
linguistic category in the sample. In Table 4, equations are calculated on the
whole sample (n = 412), and linguistic orientation is controlled by inclusion as
dummy independent variables. Thus, while the number of independent variables is
increased from 13 to 29 and 30, the sample size is roughly tripled and very large,
leaving respectively 382 and 381 degrees of freedom for each equation.
Consequently, artifactual increase in the multiple correlation coefficient due to
the increased number of independent variables is not a problem here.
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